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Abstract 
Anecdotal evidence points to the use of beauty as an indication for truth in 
mathematical problem solving. Two experiments examined the use of heuristics and tested 
the assumption that participants use symmetry as a cue for correctness in an arithmetic 
verification task. We presented additions of patterns and manipulated symmetry of the 
patterns. Speeded decisions about their correctness led to higher endorsements of additions 
with symmetric patterns, both for correct and incorrect additions. Therefore, this effect is 
not due to the fact that symmetry facilitates calculation or estimation. We found systematic 
evidence for the use of heuristics in solving mathematical tasks and we discuss how these 
findings relate to a processing fluency account of intuition in mathematical judgment.  
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Mathematicians and scientists reportedly used beauty as a cue for truth in mathematical 
judgment (Chandrasekhar, 1987; Hadamard, 1954; Stewart, 2007). Hadamard (1954) 
thought that a sense of beauty seems to be almost the only useful “drive” for discovery in 
the mathematical field. For example, in “1913, Elie Cartan […] thought of a remarkable 
class of analytic and geometric transformations in relation to the theory of groups. No 
reason was seen, at that time, for special consideration of those transformations except just 
their esthetic character. Then, some fifteen years later, experiments revealed to physicists 
some extraordinary phenomena concerning electrons, which they could only understand by 
the help of Cartan’s ideas of 1913.” (Hadamard, 1954, p. 128). However, evidence has been 
anecdotal, and the nature of the beauty-truth relationship has remained a mystery. We 
therefore aim at giving a plausible explanation for the heuristic basis of mathematical 
judgment and at providing first empirical evidence for this hypothesis.  
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the common experience underlying both 
perceived beauty1 and judged truth is processing fluency, which is the experienced ease 
with which mental content is processed (R. Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). Indeed, 
stimuli processed with greater ease elicit more positive affect (R. Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006), 
and statements that participants can read more easily are more likely to be judged as being 
true (Parks, & Toth, 2006; R. Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007). Recently, 
Topolinski and Strack (2008) demonstrated that intuitive judgments of semantic coherence 
are based on the affective reaction due to processing fluency. Authors invoked processing 
fluency to help explain a wide range of phenomena, including judged accuracy of 
aphorisms (McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000), variations in stock prices (Alter & 
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Oppenheimer, 2006), brand preferences (Lee & Labroo, 2004), or the lack of reception of 
mathematical theories that are difficult to understand (McColm, 2007). 
Processing fluency increases either through former exposure which render stimuli 
familiar, such as stimulus repetition (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) and associative learning 
(e.g, Posner & Keele, 1968; A. S. Reber, 1967), or through stimulus features, such as 
simplicity (Garner, 1974) or symmetry (Palmer, 1991; Royer, 1981), which facilitate 
perceptual processing. Applied to mathematical reasoning, processing fluency may come 
from experience with certain types of mathematical stimuli or stimulus features within the 
task, such as simplicity or symmetry, which in turn increase intuitively judged truth. As a 
first step towards testing this assumption, we demonstrate in two experiments that 
symmetry, a feature known to facilitate processing, is used as heuristic cue to correctness in 
arithmetic problems.  
Symmetry has been linked to both beauty and truth in mathematics (Cole, 1998; 
Stewart, 2007). Preference for symmetry has been observed in humans (Rhodes, Proffitt, 
Grady, & Sumich, 1998) and a wide variety of other species, including bumblebees, fishes, 
birds, and primates (see Reber, 2002). One explanation for preference for symmetry is that 
symmetry in a potential mate signals health (e.g., Gangestad, Thornhill, & Yeo, 1994). This 
view has been challenged (Kalick, Zebrowitz, Langlois, & Johnson, 1998) and, 
importantly, preference for symmetry has been found outside mating contexts, which 
requires a more general explanation, for example in terms of processing fluency (Reber, 
2002). Our experimental setup allowed testing the heuristic use of symmetry, but it will 
leave open how processing fluency, beauty and truth are interrelated.  
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We examined whether participants without background in professional mathematics 
intuitively used heuristic bases for truth in speeded arithmetic judgments. In order to speed 
responses, we trained our participants on a “response window” technique that has been used 
in research on unconscious semantic priming (Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, 
Draine, & Abrams, 1996). Response time deadlines have been used to examine intuitive 
processes in complex problem solving (Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). The basic assumption behind using response time deadlines is 
that it allows studying processes at a stage when participants generate hypotheses, before 
they know the solution2. In a similar vein, we assume that response time deadlines in our 
experiments allow studying the heuristic basis of hypothesis generation in simple arithmetic 
tasks at an early processing stage before participants could calculate or estimate the 
addition.  
In both experiments, we manipulated symmetry and examined its role in speeded 
arithmetic judgments. Participants were presented with additions consisting of symmetric 
and asymmetric dot patterns (Figure 1). Half of the additions had a correct result, half of 
them had an incorrect result. As symmetry was an irrelevant attribute in this task, bugs 
(VanLehn, 1986) or rational errors (BenZeev, 1996) could not explain any observed bias. 
Such errors are due to the erroneous use of simple, often overlearned computations, as in 
the so-called “freshman error” (Silver, 1986), where students add numerators and 
denominators in the addition of fractions (e.g., 1/3+2/7=3/10 instead of 1/3+2/7=13/21). 
However, if participants use symmetry as cue to correctness, they do not use a correct 
computation to an erroneous end; symmetry serves as a purely heuristic cue.  
Experiment 1 
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We presented additions with symmetric and asymmetric patterns, together with the 
results which were either correct or incorrect. We shall report the proportion of 
endorsements, that is, the proportion with which participants judged a given addition as 
being correct. If additions are correct and endorsements higher for additions with 
symmetric patterns than for those with asymmetric patterns, one can not distinguish 
whether this effect is due to the use of symmetry as heuristic cue or to facilitation of 
standard mathematical calculation, or estimation. However, if the presented additions are 
incorrect, one can isolate effects of the use of a heuristic cue from effects of ease of 
calculation: If participants use symmetry as heuristic cue, they are predicted to endorse 
incorrect additions with symmetric patterns more than incorrect additions with asymmetric 
patterns. In contrast, if additions with symmetric patterns are just easier to calculate, 
participants are expected to endorse incorrect additions with symmetric patterns less than 
incorrect additions with asymmetric patterns, yielding higher correct rejection rates for 
incorrect additions with symmetric patterns, compared to incorrect additions with 
asymmetric patterns.  
Method 
Participants: Thirty-eight students at the University of Bergen participated in the 
experiment. It lasted around 30 minutes, and participants were paid 50 Norwegian Krones 
(about $8 at that time). Ten students were excluded from analysis: Eight participants 
uniformly responded “correct” to all patterns or to all symmetric patterns; one reported on 
the strategy questionnaire that he more probably pressed “correct” for symmetric patterns; 
one gave less than 50% of the responses within the response time window. We applied the 
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most conservative inclusion criteria; findings essentially were the same with less restrictive 
criteria. 
Materials: Participants were presented with dot pattern additions, one by one. Half of 
the additions were correct (e.g., 15+18=33), half of them were wrong (e.g., 15+18=27). 
Incorrect sums were either smaller or greater than the corresponding correct result, but the 
differences were balanced across symmetry conditions. Each addition was shown twice, 
once as a symmetric pattern, once as an asymmetric pattern, yielding 96 dot pattern-shaped 
additions (Figure 1). Symmetric patterns always were rectangles, with three to five rows. 
Operands with asymmetric patterns always had as many dots and as many rows as the same 
operand with symmetric patterns, but dots were rearranged so that they possessed neither 
vertical symmetry nor horizontal symmetry.  
Procedure: Participants were given earphones. They sat in front of a computer screen 
and had a serial response box (Psychology Software Tools) in front of them. They were 
instructed to verify the correctness of additions and then got instructions for the response 
time window technique. During pilot testing on verifying additions under time pressure, but 
with different materials, some participants said that they found it more natural to react to 
correct solutions with the right index finger and to incorrect solutions with the left index 
finger. We therefore marked the outmost right key on the response box with green tape and 
the outmost left key with red tape and instructed participants to press the green key if the 
solution was correct and the red key if the solution was incorrect. As half of the additions 
with symmetric patterns and half of those with asymmetric patterns were correct, symmetry 
was not confounded with side of response. The addition was shown 600 ms. After the 
addition disappeared, a brief tone was presented via earphones; 600 ms after onset of the 
R365B: Heuristics in mathematical intuition 8 
first tone, a second brief tone was presented. Participants were instructed to respond after 
onset of the first tone, but before onset of the second tone; this resulted in a 600 ms 
response time window.  Before the experimental trials started, participants were trained 
with stimuli not shown in the experimental block. The response time window was 
progressively shortened: First, participants were trained on a window of 1800 ms until they 
had responded to at least eight additions within the required time. They were subsequently 
trained on 1200 ms (at least eight responses within the required time) and on the final 
response time window of 600 ms (at least 16 responses). Then, the experimental trials 
started. After the last addition, participants had to complete a strategy questionnaire on 
paper. First, they had to check whether or not they used a strategy. If yes, they were 
instructed to describe their strategy in detail. We were interested in whether participants 
intentionally used symmetry as cue for correctness. After having completed the strategy 
questionnaire, participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.  
Results and Discussion 
In all experiments, participants had to give at least 50% of their responses within the 
response time window in order to be included into the analysis, and only responses 
provided within this window were analyzed. For the participants included in the analysis, 
percentage of responses within the response time window was M = 92.8%, SD = 5.2, across 
all conditions. 
The findings are shown in the left panel of Figure 2. A 2 x 2-factorial analysis of 
variance, with the factors symmetry of patterns and task correctness showed that 
participants were more likely to endorse additions with symmetric patterns (M = .64, SD = 
.16) than additions with asymmetric patterns (M = .49, SD = .14; F (1, 28) = 17.68, p < 
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.001; reffect size = .62). Other effects were not significant (Fs < 1). Please note that we report 
endorsements; therefore, higher proportion of endorsement means a higher probability of 
hits for correct additions, a higher probability of false alarms for incorrect additions, or 
both. This means in terms of accuracy that our participants increased the proportion of hits, 
but decreased the proportion of correct rejections when additions had symmetric patterns 
than when additions had asymmetric patterns. Indeed, d’-measures for additions with 
symmetric and asymmetric patterns did not differ (d’symmetric = .04, d’asymmetric = .04). This 
finding does not support the notion that symmetry facilitates calculations or estimation, 
which would have led to higher proportions of both hits and correct rejections. 
In sum, participants performed at chance level and relied on symmetry as heuristic 
cue for correctness. As participants were not able to solve the task, symmetry may have 
been the only stimulus feature that participants could rely upon.  
Experiment 2 
Although suggestive, it would be more persuasive to observe the same effect of 
symmetry on endorsement when accuracy is above chance. This experiment was identical 
to Experiment 1, with the exception that display times of the additions were increased to 
1800 ms, but participants still had to react within the response-time window of 600 ms 
which followed the presentation of the addition. We used the method outlined in 
Experiment 1 to isolate the use of a heuristic cue from effects of easier calculation of 
symmetric patterns. 
The extension of presentation time was predicted to render calculation possible, 
especially for symmetric tasks because participants can use simple strategies, such as 
estimating surfaces or counting the first row. We expected endorsements to be determined 
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by two processes: First, by symmetry as heuristic cue at an early stage of processing an 
addition, as observed in Experiment 1, and second by calculation or estimation of the sums 
when participants were given more time. This would yield both the symmetry main effect 
observed in Experiment 1 and a symmetry-by-correctness interaction. Participants with 
extended, but still limited time still use symmetry as a heuristic cue, yielding the main 
effect, but their ability to perform some calculation or estimation yields the interaction. We 
expect participants to endorse more correct additions with symmetric patterns than with 
asymmetric patterns, but to endorse less incorrect additions with symmetric patterns than 
with asymmetric patterns. The reason for predicting this interaction is that we expect 
estimation to be easier for additions with symmetric rather than asymmetric patterns.  
Method 
Participants: Twenty-six students at the University of Bergen participated in the 
experiment for payment. Two students had to be excluded from analysis because they 
uniformly pressed “correct”, one for all stimuli and one for correct stimuli with symmetric 
patterns. Findings essentially were the same with less restrictive inclusion criteria. 
Materials and Procedure: Materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, 
with the exception of exposure time: Additions were presented 1800 ms instead of 600 ms; 
the response time window was 600 ms, as in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The percentage of responses within the response time window was M = 93.9%, SD = 
6.4, across all conditions.  
The 2 x 2-factorial analysis of variance showed that participants were more likely to 
endorse additions with symmetric patterns than with asymmetric patterns (F (1, 23) = 
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33.13, p < .001; reffect size = .77), and more likely to endorse correct than incorrect additions 
(F (1, 23) = 73.25, P < .001; reffect size = .87). Although performance was at above-chance 
level, participants were still more likely to endorse additions with symmetric patterns than 
additions with asymmetric patterns (Figure 2, right panel). The predicted significant 
interaction term (F (1, 23) = 5.08, p = .034) indicated that participants could accurately 
calculate or estimate some of the correct tasks with symmetric patterns so that the effect of 
symmetry was more pronounced for correct additions (symmetric patterns: M = .78, SD = 
.13; asymmetric patterns: M = .60, SD = .14; t (23) = 5.66; reffect size = .76) than for incorrect 
additions (symmetric patterns: M = .47, SD = .14; asymmetric patterns: M = .37, SD = .16; t 
(23) = 3.16; reffect size = .55). Importantly, although the effect of symmetry was more 
pronounced for correct additions than for incorrect additions, suggesting an effect of 
calculation, both differences were significant. Symmetry still indicated truth for both 
correct and incorrect additions. Note that the main effect of symmetry was not due to the 
fact that additions of symmetric patterns were easier to calculate or estimate than additions 
with asymmetric patterns. Had this been the case, incorrect additions with symmetric 
patterns would have been endorsed less than those with asymmetric patterns, yielding 
greater accuracy for symmetric than for asymmetric patterns. However, we found that 
incorrect additions with symmetric patterns were endorsed more than those with 
asymmetric patterns. Moreover, as in Experiment 1, d’-measures for additions with 
symmetric and asymmetric patterns did not differ significantly (d’symmetric = .64, d’asymmetric = 
.53, t (23) = 1.26). Therefore, the results for incorrect additions clearly supported a notion 
that participants used symmetry as heuristic cue. In sum, participants continued to use 
symmetry as a cue for correctness even when they calculated or estimated in order to verify 
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the result of the additions, and when their accuracy was above chance. 
General Discussion 
This study combined existing research in mathematical cognition (see Campbell, 
2005; Dehaene, 1997) with research into intuitive judgments (e.g., Bolte & Goschke, 2005; 
Bowers et al., 1990; Topolinski & Strack, 2008) and, more generally, the heuristics and 
biases tradition (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Our experiments demonstrated the 
use of symmetry as heuristic cue in a speeded arithmetic verification task. Symmetry 
increased the proportion of endorsements in speeded judgments, even if participants 
performed at above-chance level. Importantly, compared to incorrect additions with 
asymmetric patterns, symmetry even increased endorsement of incorrect additions with 
symmetric patterns, supporting the notion that participants used symmetry as a cue for 
correctness.  
We do not claim that people who solve simple arithmetic verification tasks without 
response deadline always first generate a hypothesis of whether the task is correct or not, 
although we neither exclude this possibility. What we have shown is that people who do not 
have enough time to analyze the problem use heuristic cues in order to assess the 
correctness of a proposed solution. This situation is comparable to a mathematician who 
has discovered a plausible solution to a problem and now wants a quick assessment of 
whether this solution “feels” right. In contrast, a mathematician who analyzes the problem 
thoroughly may take a different route and does not necessarily “feel” whether the solution 
is correct or not. 
Higher mathematics is more complicated than the arithmetic tasks used in our study, 
and professional mathematicians are more experienced in evaluating hypotheses than our 
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participants. We presented evidence for a plausible mechanism that may underlie intuitive 
judgments in simple mathematical tasks. Nevertheless, the global feeling of fluency that 
accompanies the solution of simple arithmetic tasks and complex mathematical problems 
may be the same. 
Our findings suggest a possible solution to the mystery why beauty serves as a cue for 
truth in the context of mathematical discovery. However, we did not test causal 
relationships between beauty, fluency, and truth. Theoretically, there are at least three 
alternatives: First, beauty – which is correlated with processing fluency – may be used as 
cue for truth. This comes close to what mathematicians and scientists like Hadamard (1954) 
and Chandrasekhar (1987) claimed. Second, processing fluency may influence perceived 
beauty, which in turn may be used for judging truth. This would not contradict Hadamard 
or Chandrasekhar because they did not ponder about where beauty comes from. Third, in 
accordance to the processing fluency view advocated by R. Reber et al. (2004), processing 
fluency may influence both perceived beauty and judged truth; the latter are correlated 
because they have a common underlying mechanism. Beauty in this case would not be 
causally involved in assessing truth. 
Whatever the causal mechanisms might be: Our study has provided strong evidence 
for the heuristic basis of solving simple additions, and we put forward a plausible 
explanation for why beauty is truth in mathematical discovery. 
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Footnotes 
1) Hadamard (1954) and Chandrasekhar (1987) used the term “beauty” broadly and 
included qualities like “elegance” or “simplicity of a task” which yield mild positive affect. 
We use beauty in this article in the same broad sense (see also Reber et al., 2004). 
2) Response time deadlines can be used for purposes other than the assessment of 
cognitive processes before the solution is known. In mathematical cognition, such deadlines 
were used in order to examine retrieval versus procedural strategies during calculating 
(Campbell & Austin, 2003). 
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Figure Caption: 
Figure 1. Examples of additions used in Experiments 1 and 2; top: symmetric patterns; 
bottom: asymmetric patterns. 
Figure 2. Left: Proportion of speeded endorsements for correct and incorrect additions in 
Experiment 1. All patterns were shown for 600 ms. Sym600 = symmetric patterns; 
Asym600 = asymmetric patterns. Right: Proportion of speeded endorsements for correct 
and incorrect additions in Experiment 2. All patterns were shown for 1800 ms. Sym1800 = 
symmetric patterns; Asym1800 = asymmetric patterns.  
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Figure 2: 
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